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Logic of an Australia-South Africa FTA
Ann Hodgkinson and André Jordaan

A

ustralia, previously a strong supporter of multilateral trade liberalisation,
recently began negotiating a series of free trade agreements with countries
in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper explores, at a conceptual level, the
question of whether there is an argument for expanding the geographical scope of
these negotiations to include a link to our neighbouring southern continent of
Africa. The argument involves a development of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ framework
to indicate that a ‘hub-to-hub’ agreement between Australia and South Africa
would bring benefits both in terms of increased bilateral trade, and provide
strategic advantages through enhanced investment and intra-industry trade.
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between two countries are a ‘second best’
approach to achieving gains from liberalisation of trading arrangements compared
with multilateral reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers. However, this
approach has proliferated in recent years due to difficulties in achieving further
multilateral reductions after the failure of the Cancun negotiations, and
particularly in response to the growth in Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs)
throughout the world. RTAs have emerged strongly in Europe and the Americas.
Asian region countries have been late in entering such arrangements but recently
there has been an upsurge in activity in this region (Lloyd and MacLaren, 2004).
There is a possibility that, as they proliferate, FTAs will coalesce into a
tripolar system of trading blocs based on Europe, North America and Asia (Lloyd
and McLaren, 2004). The economic theory of preferential trading systems or trade
blocs essentially concerns changes to world economic welfare arising from a move
to discriminatory trading arrangements. Welfare change is the net effect of trade
creation (positive welfare) and trade diversion (negative welfare). Trade creation
occurs between members of the bloc as cheaper imports from one member replace
higher cost local production, such that net welfare of members of the bloc
increases as all countries benefit from production and allocation efficiencies.
Trade diversion occurs when lower cost imports from a non-member are replaced
with higher cost imports from a member, who differentially benefits from the
reduction in protection, such that net welfare of members and non-members falls.
It is further assumed that as the number of blocs falls and each bloc becomes
larger, they can use their market power to raise, or lower more slowly, relative
tariffs against non-members thus accentuating both negative trade diversion and
positive trade creation effects. Consequently, as FTAs coalesce into RTAs, the net
welfare effect is ambiguous as the number of trading blocs decreases and the
market power of each bloc increases. Further, it is argued that the welfare
Ann Hodgkinson is an Associate Professor and Head of School of Economics and
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minimising number of blocs is three. This negative welfare effect however is
likely to be less if the blocs form with ‘natural’ partners, defined as trading
partners with low transaction (transportation and communication) costs, that is
continental FTAs. The high tariffs against non-members’ imports will not result
in significant trade diversion in such cases as this trade would not occur anyway
due to these high transaction costs (Krugman, 1993).
Faced with this prediction, countries outside natural trading blocs would be at
a considerable disadvantage and may suffer significant trade diversion welfare
losses. Oceania, Africa and Latin America are in this category. Even though
theoretically non-discriminatory tariff reductions would be a better policy for such
countries (Jones, 1993; Lloyd, 2002; Schiff and Winter, 2003), they will seek to
counter this effect with bilateral agreements based on mutual interests. An
Australian-South African agreement is a possible response to this situation. This
paper explores whether it is a feasible option, and discusses the possible sources of
gains from trade from such a FTA.
The arguments in favour of an Australian-South African FTA fall into two
categories, which are evaluated in the following sections. First, there is statistical
evidence of a rapid growth in trade values between the two countries. The rate of
growth in this trade is higher than that of any of the other countries with which
Australia has or is considering FTAs, except China. It can also be shown that
trade between the two countries is largely complementary. Australia exports
predominantly mineral products to South Africa and South African exports to
Australia are predominantly manufactures. This complementarity creates a
common interest and highlights the likely market protection role of a FTA.
Second, it has considerable strategic advantages. A ‘hub-to-hub’ agreement
would connect Africa and Asia. If the ‘rules of origin’ conditions were ever to be
relaxed, it positions both countries to act as gateways for trade between these two
continents in the future. Conversely, while the current situation regarding these
rules persists, it makes both countries attractive sites for foreign direct investment
from each other. A further strategic advantage arises from its potential to
stimulate intra-industry trade within the passenger motor vehicle (PMV) industry.
Both countries have relatively high tariff protection for this industry at the
moment, and both have plans to reduce this in the near future. The PMV varieties
produced in these countries are complementary, such that a FTA would help each
industry to expand their exports, thus gaining economies of scale before having to
face increased international competition in the future.
These topics are explored within the hub-and-spoke framework developed
below. A statistical analysis of existing trade, focusing on the potential trade
creating and trade diversion effects likely to arise from such a FTA is provided,
and the strategic considerations through intra-industry trade and enhanced
investment are analysed. While it is not possible here to develop a full statistical
modelling of the net welfare benefits related to an Australian-South African FTA,
the case is made that, at least conceptually, there is a logic to such an agreement
and that it should be explored further as a policy option.
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Framework for an Australian-South African FTA
Economic analysis of FTAs emphasises evaluation of net welfare benefits likely to
arise from such an agreement, where the net benefits are the value of the trade
creating effects minus any trade diversion effects. The natural trading partners
theory postulates that the negative trade diversion effect will be less if trading
agreements form between geographically close partners. Baier and Bergstrand
(2004) argue that logical or ‘natural’ partners in FTAs are determined by a
combination of comparative advantage and geographical features. A comparison
of the economic features of Australia and South Africa are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Economic Comparison: Australia and South Africa, 2003
Australia
GDP ($US) Billions
GDP per capita ($US)
Population (millions)
GDP growth (10 year av.)
Population growth (10 yr av.)
Population density per sq. km.
Unemployment rate
Capital – Labour ratio* ($US)
Ranking in Economic Remoteness**
*

518.4
29,000
19.9
3.8%
1.2% p.a.
2.5
6%
9,246
2

South Africa
159.9
3,503
45.3
2.7%
1.7% p.a.
35.1
31%
1,472
3

Calculated as consumption of fixed capital divided by labour force.

** Australia and South Africa are ranked second and third most remote countries in the sample of
countries considered by Ewing and Battersby (2005). Remoteness is measured as the percentage
of world GDP occurring within an increasing kilometre distance from a country.
Sources: World Book (2004); CIA World Factbook (2004); International Monetary Fund (2004).

It could be argued that Australia and South Africa are not natural trading
partners. They are over 11,000 Km apart, although not an abnormally different
separation than for several other countries negotiating FTAs with Australia. Both
are only medium-sized economies and hence bilateral trade flows are not likely to
be large. However, both are relatively remote from the major world economic
centres and hence could be excluded from emerging trading blocs, suggesting that
they should look for alternative means of enhancing their future trade growth.
Futher, they have different factor endowments with South Africa being relatively
labour intensive and Australia relatively capital intensive. This indicates that
bilateral trade would be consistent with national comparative advantages.
Empirical studies do not support the ‘natural partners’ hypothesis. Neither
size of existing trade flows or geographic proximity is necessarily associated with
welfare effects (Schiff and Winter, 2003). As Bhagwati (1999:14-15) points out,
trade creation/diversion effects depend not only on the size of trade flows but also
on the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and non-member imports.
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With high substitution, trade diversion will be significant regardless of existing
trade levels while low substitution rates enhance welfare benefits from trade
creation even if existing trade is low. Further, agreements between geographically
close partners will not generate increased welfare if the countries have had past
hostilities, while agreements between distant countries with shared interests can
promote trade. Each proposition needs to be analysed on a case-by-case basis.
In recent years, both Australia and South Africa, despite a general preference
for multilateral trade liberalisation, have been interested in bilateral agreements.
Much of this activity has been a response to the proliferation of agreements
throughout the world involving their major trading partners, and a fear of being
excluded from the merging blocs because of their size and remoteness (Bailey and
Perry, 1993). In addition, in a time of coalescing trading blocs, each country has
needed to act to safeguard its existing markets against any potential future closure
inherent in a tripolar bloc world trading system (Mansfield, 1998). This idea
gained currency in the early 1990s, after the US abandoned its strong adherence to
non-discriminatory trade policy and began negotiating bilateral trade agreements.
South Africa plays a key role in the African Union and on a regional level in
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which includes 13 other
African countries mainly located in the southern and eastern regions. It took a
leading role in establishing the New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) which aims to unite all African countries and promote the economic
renewal of the continent. It is thus envisaged that over the long run the whole of
Africa would be united, enhancing the potential of pro-active action. South Africa
is also a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), along with
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. SACU has a FTA with the European
Union and since December 2004, has engaged in a preferential trading agreement
with MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia) and
is presently negotiating a FTA with the United States (Schiff and Winters, 2003).
Australia has preferred multilateral trade negotiations and remains committed
to APEC’s goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region.
However, it is also willing to consider FTAs with other significant individual
economies or regional groupings likely to deliver faster and deeper liberalisation.
It has a comprehensive Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement with New
Zealand and allows preferential access to goods from the South Pacific Islands and
from Papua New Guinea. Australia has developed a number of FTAs in recent
years with Thailand, Singapore and the US. According to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2005), Australia is currently negotiating
agreements with China, Japan, Malaysia and UAE.
Figure 1 maps the growing involvement of Australia and South Africa in
bilateral and regional trading agreements. As discussed below, the AustraliaSouth Africa FTA should offer trade creation benefits arising from both interindustry and intra-industry trade. The higher growth rates and per capita incomes
in Australia provide an opportunity for South African firms to expand their
markets and provide badly needed employment opportunities to local people.
Even if the Asian and African ‘hub-and-spoke’ arrangements were to coalesce into
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regional blocs incorporating Australia and South Africa respectively, there would
be logic in pursuing an agreement for strategic purposes. An agreement linking
these two blocs would enhance the importance of each partner as trading ‘hubs’,
making them attractive locations for investment, and giving them ‘first mover’
advantages in becoming gateways for regional trade flows between the two blocs.

Figure 1: Australian and South African Trading Agreements

Notes: SACU = Southern African Customs Union: South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
Swaziland.
SADU = Southern African Development Community: South Africa, Angola, Botswana,
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
MERCOSUR = Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia.
UAE = United Arab Emirates.
Source: Adapted from Schiff and Winters (2003:76), and Lloyd and MacLaren (2004).

Bilateral Trade
South Africa is currently Australia’s largest and most dynamic trading partner on
the African continent. Bilateral relations already exist and both countries have a
history of productive cooperation across a wide range of issues. These include the
Commonwealth, World Trade Organisation, Cairns Group, Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the New World Wine
Producers Group, the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds, fisheries
protection, customs cooperation, human rights, migration and people smuggling,
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law enforcement, and defence relations. Another forum for economic and trade
cooperation between Australia and South Africa is the Indian Ocean Rim
Association for Regional Cooperation (DFAT, 2005). Thus the two countries
have a commonality of interest and open communication channels that would
facilitate development of a FTA.

Table 2: Australia’s Merchandise Trade with South Africa ($A’000)
Year

Total
exports

%
change

Total
imports

%
change

90/91
91/92
92/93
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

178,099
226,144
334,242
431,877
658,874
945,922
1,020,735
1,064,495
912,603
1,262,260
1,298,206
1,295,620
1,324,813
1,589,100

26.97
47.80
29.21
52.56
43.57
7.91
4.29
-14.27
38.31
2.85
-0.19
2.25
19.90

99,285
113,525
191,632
288,280
365,424
453,299
472,638
561,292
640,307
852,116
858,711
965,887
1,135,252
1,249,964

14.34
68.80
50.43
26.76
24.05
4.27
18.75
14.08
33.08
0.77
12.48
17.53
10.10

Balance of
trade
78,813
112,618
142,610
143,597
293,451
492,624
548,097
503,203
272,296
410,143
439,496
329,734
189,561
339,136

%
change
42.89
26.63
0.69
104.36
67.87
11.26
-8.19
-45.89
50.62
7.16
-24.97
-42.51
78.91

Source: DFAT (2004; 2005)

Over the past five years, total trade between these two countries grew by
approximately 10 per cent per year and, in 2004, it was valued at $A2.8 billion
(see Table 2). In addition, bilateral exports of services from Australia and South
Africa were $A267million and A$275million respectively in 2004 (DFAT, 2005).
Taking a long term perspective, the average quarterly rate of growth of trade
between the two countries since 1980 was 2.4 per cent. This growth rate is the
same as that of Australian trade with Malaysia, and higher than that of trade with
Thailand (1.5 per cent), UAE (1.7 per cent) and Singapore (2.04 per cent), all of
which are involved in preferential trade negotiations with Australia.
This growth was partly due to the lifting of sanctions but South Africa is also
purposely moving away from commodity-based products to more diversified
exports including manufactured products. Current exports such as passenger
motor vehicles (PMV) were not exported before the sanctions and this trade is thus
not merely the result of re-opening old markets. South Africa’s trade is still under
its full potential and new trading relationships could contribute to filling this gap.
South Africa is Australia’s 16th most important export destination and its 24th
most important source of imports. The composition of trade largely reflects each
country’s comparative advantages. Australian main exports to South Africa are
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confidential items and special transactions (particularly alumina), coal, crude
petroleum, nickel and meat, with some manufactured items such as PMV,
machinery and equipment, aircraft and parts. Australia’s imports from South
Africa were mainly manufactures such as PMVs (mostly BMW series 3 vehicles),
furniture, pig iron, televisions and specialised machinery. In 2004, South Africa
was the fourth largest exporter of PMVs into Australia. It was also the fifth
largest source of arms and ammunition (DFAT, 2005). Increasing trade volumes
indicate a potential for renegotiating the trading relationship between the two
countries, with the implication that trade creating welfare benefits will increase in
future. Many of the items imported into each country are also produced locally.
Thus a FTA would have trade creating effects in most of the major traded
products, where imports could replace any remaining inefficient local production.
The extent to which these positive welfare effects may be offset by negative
trade diversion effects depends on the relative tariff position of these two countries
against the rest of the world (ROW). Both countries have been involved in
programs of multilateral tariff reductions from relatively high post-war protection
regimes. South Africa now has zero tariffs on most products imported from
Australia, and thus little trade diversion would result from a FTA in these sectors.
Both countries still have tariffs averaging just under five per cent on manufactured
products, but with higher levels on PMV, textiles, clothing, footwear and leather,
wood and paper products, and furniture. Thus, a FTA may result in a small trade
diversion effect in these sectors, which predominantly would occur in Australia if
growing South African manufactures displaced similar products from other
countries. The impacts on PMV trade are discussed in the next section. Countries
also need to consider any negative impacts that could arise from the loss of
customs revenue if they rely on it as a source of government income (de Melo et
al, 1993). This is not an issue for Australia, where it is only 2.4 per cent of total
government revenue (Commonwealth Government Budget Paper No. 1, 20052006) or South Africa where customs duty was only 3.6 per cent of total tax
revenue (Schiff and Winter, 2003:95).
Overall, an initial evaluation of a FTA between Australia and South Africa
would indicate that it would result in a positive net welfare effect. This effect may
be small as trade volumes, except for the two major export items, and existing
tariffs are relatively low. However, this initial assessment does not include effects
that may arise from strategic issues associated with intra-industry trade and
investment considerations, as discussed below.

Strategic Considerations
Intra-industry Trade
The general findings outlined above are modified if trade involves imperfectly
competitive goods. In a situation where there are many import-competing goods
produced with economies of scale, several effects can arise from a FTA.
Production of some goods will expand as the partner’s market is taken over and
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firms obtain cost reductions with scale, consequently consumer prices fall. The
competing firms in that market cease production as they become non-competitive.
These two effects generate trade creation welfare benefits from reduced prices for
consumers in both partner countries arising from the elimination of protection and
reduced production costs. Profits, however, move from the less successful firms
to those in the more competitive country. Imports from the rest of the world
(ROW) may be reduced if they are displaced by the FTA partner’s lower cost
production, due to trade diversion in the first country and trade displacement by
domestic production in the successful country. The extent to which these negative
welfare effects arise depends on how significantly the relative tariff between the
FTA partners and the ROW rises, thus suppressing the benefits from the
economies of scale cost reductions. This depends on the elasticity of substitution
between domestic production and ROW imports (Corden, 1999:196-197).
For a FTA to be viable, each country must have firms that can benefit from
these economies of scale and can expand into each other’s markets, such that both
countries achieve some increase in production, employment and profits (Baldwin
and Venables, 1995, Krugman, 1995). The likelihood of this increases with
trading of differentiated products. Consumers in each country buy a number of
varieties, due to differences in tastes. Trade thus reflects specialisation advantages
from decreasing returns to scale rather than differences in the factor endowments
of each country. Of the models based on imperfect competition, horizontal
differentiation is relevant in this scenario. There are two main approaches to
horizontal product differentiation, namely the ‘love of variety’ approach
(Krugman, 1979, Helpman, 1981) and the ‘ideal-variety’ approach (Lancaster,
1966; 1980). The first assumes that consumers value variety and prefer a larger
variety of goods. Under the second, a certain specification of a product rather than
the availability of a range of goods is preferred by consumers. Each consumer has
a most preferred or ideal product. Thus, even if similar products are manufactured
locally, some consumers will prefer imported models. In the ‘love-of-variety’
approach goods enter the utility function symmetrically and an increase in
available varieties increases the welfare of all consumers. In the ‘ideal-variety’
approach, goods enter the utility function asymmetrically and an increase in
variety does not benefit those previously consuming their ideal variety. Thus, for
PMV, imports and exports will occur simultaneously in the same market segment
making some consumers better off while others may not gain (Sichei, 2005).
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in South Africa developed an
Integrated Manufacturing Strategy in 2002 because manufacturing was regarded
as a catalyst for accelerated growth, increased exports and employment. South
Africa’s competitive advantage in PMV is based on its ability to operate with short
or low-volume runs, competitive tooling costs and a high degree of manufacturing
flexibility. As a right-hand-drive (RHD) country, it has a further cost advantage
when exporting to similar countries such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand
(DTI, 2002). The main PMV producers are Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota and BMW.
Ford (S.A.) is about to commence exports of the Focus model to Australia and
New Zealand. It also manufactures the Ranger (or Courier) and Drifter for those

Logic of an Australia-South Africa FTA 155

markets. Volkswagen (S.A.) produces the Golf model and has been positioned as
its sole supplier to the Asia-Pacific region. The Focus and the Golf compete in the
medium size market segment. South Africa currently predominantly exports
BMW series 3 vehicles to Australia, US, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan. In 2003, it exported 21,254 units into the Australian prestige
market segment. Toyota exported 8,000 Corollas to Australia in 2003 and a
substantial increase is expected in 2004 and 2005 (Anon, 2003). Australia
received 15 per cent of the South African PMV exports in 2003 (DTI, 2004).
The Australian PMV industry now largely produces for the large car market
segment. Ford produces the Falcon and Territory, both of which are exported to
South Africa. Holden produces the Commodore and Lexcon, while Mitsubishi
produces the Magna. Neither firm currently exports to South Africa. Toyota
produces the Avalon and Camry 6 in the large car segment and the Camry 4 —the
only medium car now produced in Australia. Both versions of the Camry have
substantial exports. Australia also produces small volumes of the Ford Fairlane,
LTD, Holden Statesman and Caprice, and the Holden Monaro since 2001 in the
prestige market segment, but none of these are currently exported (DITR, 2005).
Analysis of PMV production and trade has to consider global strategies of car
companies in addition to comparative costs. Australian and South African PMV
producers are subsidiaries of global corporations and are affected by their parent’s
global positioning. Firms, faced with large economies of scale, high R&D costs,
and steep learning curves tend to adopt a strategic trade position, involving
demands for both access to export markets and protection of their home markets
(Milner and Joffie, 1989), which helps to explain the relatively high tariffs in these
sectors. Their support for FTAs is mixed. A FTA is opposed if it is likely to
result in direct competition to local production but supported if it is likely to open
up new markets for locally developed and differentiated models (Hoy, 2003).
Further, regional production rationalisation by global motor corporations is
likely to influence their attitudes to trading agreements. For example, under
Toyota’s previous (prior to 1999) multinational strategy, both its Australian and
South African subsidiaries produced Corollas.
As a result of regional
rationalisation Australia now imports Corollas from Japan and, since 2003, from
South Africa. It exports Camrys and Avalons to New Zealand, the Middle East,
South Africa, South East Asia and Oceania (Toyota Global website, 2006). Thus
an Australian-South African FTA would be consistent with this strategy.
Small cars represent the largest segment of the Australian market with over
265,000 units in 2004 (DITR, 2005) imported mainly from Japan, Republic of
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and other Asian countries. Increased imports from
South Africa would normally have a trade diversion effect against these countries.
However, because Australia has, or is currently negotiating FTAs with many of
these countries, a FTA with South Africa would prevent trade discrimination
against its exports, rather than create trade diversion in its favour in most cases —
under the circumstances, significant trade diversion might occur only against small
cars from the Republic of Korea.

156 Ann Hodgkinson and André Jordaan

Two other South African PMV producers, Ford and Volkswagen, are
planning to export to Australia. These models would compete against locally
produced Camry 4 series cars and should produce some small trade creation
welfare effects. Given that Toyota is the only remaining Australian producer of
medium-size cars, it could be assumed that Australia is relatively inefficient in this
segment. However, since 2001, over 60 per cent of Australian production has
been exported (DITR, 2005) suggesting otherwise. Thus increased competition in
the medium car market should have trade creating welfare benefits with
distribution of profits being determined by the relative strengths of each producer.
Australia also has competitive advantages in the large car segment. Since
2001, almost 20 per cent of production has been exported. South Africa does not
produce in this segment. Toyota and Ford are currently the main exporters to
South Africa, although a FTA may encourage Holden and Mitsubishi to also
commence exports. An expansion of production would create welfare benefits for
Australia if prices fall with economies of scale. Australian manufacturers have a
cost advantage in being RHD producers and the transport cost effect would be
minimised as the alternative producers in Europe, Japan and the US have to cover
similar distances. Thus trade diversion should not be significant. In South Africa
this market segment is probably small because low average income levels suggest
only a small proportion of the population can afford large and prestige cars.
South Africa exports of PMV into Australia are currently predominantly the
BMW series 3 vehicles in the prestige segment. Australian imports almost 90 per
cent of this segment and has no exports. There may be a small trade creating
welfare effect against local prestige car production, but the main effect would be
trade diversion against other prestige car imports, which are currently coming
particularly from Germany and the US. Due to BMW’s global production strategy
(BMW website, 2006), the South African BMWs would not compete against
German production of this brand, but would of course compete against models
from other German and European manufacturers. Trade diversion effects would
be reduced by RHD cost savings and by lower transport costs from South Africa
to Australia. South Africa would also benefit from trade creation from economies
of scale and cost savings from expanded production leading to price reductions.
The welfare gains and losses discussed above are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Possible Welfare Effects of an Australia-South Africa FTA
from PMV trade.
Production with Trade Creation Benefits
Segment
Small
Medium
Large
Prestige

South Africa
Corolla
Golf, Focus
BMW

Diversion Possibilities

Australia

South Africa

Camry 4
Camry 6, Territory

Some
Minor

Australia
Some
Minor
Minor
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Investment
If both countries already have low tariffs on most traded goods, a FTA can deliver
benefits from improvements in regulations on things such as investment, trade in
services (banking, financial services, transport), protection of intellectual property,
non-tariff measures, the settlement of disputes, health and safety, and product
standards. Reducing and harmonising regulations will generate a range of benefits
likely to stimulate investment flows between the partners leading to opportunities,
not only for FDI, but also co-production, joint marketing and the transfer of
technology (Weintraub, 1993, Wonnacott, 2001).
These benefits are heightened if the two partners in a FTA are also ‘hubs’
within their own regional trading areas. The strategic benefits will vary depending
on the rules of origin conditions contained in each hub’s arrangements with its
other FTA spoke partners (Atkins, 1993). If these do not allow the trading of
goods originating in one spoke through the hub to its other spokes, then the ‘hubto-hub’ arrangements will stimulate FDI and joint ventures located in the partner
hub. Thus, for example, should South African firms wish to access the US and
Asian markets already involved in FTAs with Australia, they will need to invest in
production facilities in Australia. The reduction in regulation and harmonisation
of standards negotiated within the Australia-South Africa FTA will assist this flow
of investment and would generate economic benefit to Australia. Conversely, the
FTA would facilitate an inflow of investment to South Africa from Australian
firms seeking to access the wider African and EU markets.
Investment in the two countries might also realign, reflecting their different
factor endowments. Labour intensive manufacturers could move to South Africa
and export back into Australia, as an alternative to the current movement into
Asian countries. This trend could increase over time as Asian labour costs rise.
Conversely, African processors of raw materials may find Australia a more
attractive location, contributing to the current exports of minerals and metals.
Such changes would be efficiency enhancing.
Should the conditions affecting the existing FTAs already entered into by
each hub country allow the re-export of products through the partner country into
its ‘spoke’ markets, then this FTA would have the added advantage of converting
Australia into a gateway for African exports into Asia, and make South Africa a
gateway for Asian exports into Africa. Achieving this type of change to the rules
of origin conditions is problematic, and thus the initial strategic benefits will
largely be through FDI as discussed above. Some analyses of export-led growth
indicate that much of the benefit arises through the nexus between trade and
investment rather than exports in themselves (Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994).

Conclusion
Both Australia and South Africa are currently involved in developing a series of
regional FTA/RTAs and are developing into hubs within their own regions. It is
argued that a FTA joining these two hubs would have strategic advantages in
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addition to the usual net welfare trade creation benefits by linking Asia and Africa.
In part, the regional gateway role is an opportunistic advantage from being the
first pairing between the two regions based on common geopolitical interests.
This gateway role will initially be manifest in an increase in investment facilitated
by improved regulatory environments negotiated in the FTA. It also positions
both countries to take advantage of any future liberalisation of trading rules
relating to the re-export of products within FTAs.
While the initial trade creating benefits may not be large, the rapid growth in
bilateral trade indicates that these should increase in the future. Furthermore, a
FTA would have some interesting impacts on both countries’ PMV industries.
Both industries currently comprise subsidiaries of global motor companies that are
attempting to establish their own positions within the world market. Each has
specialised in a different market segment, providing an opportunity to expand into
each others market and thus gain economies of scale. This provides the PMV
manufacturers in both countries with an opportunity to expand their export
markets without any substantial threat to existing production and employment.
The actual value of the welfare effects associated with an Australia-South
Africa FTA can only be measured through a complex modelling exercise. Prior to
any modelling, a conceptual analysis is required to set its parameters, which has
been attempted here. Computerised general equilibrium (CGE) models as widely
used to evaluate trading agreements predominantly incorporate perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. To capture the effects highlighted in
this paper, modifications to include imperfect competition and decreasing returns
to scale within the PMV industry would be required. If it is considered that the
conceptual argument mounted here warrants placing a FTA between Australia and
South Africa on the policy agenda, such a modelling exercise would be the next
step in developing this proposition.
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